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ABSTRACT
Renowned civil rights advocate and race man Thurgood Marshall
came of age as a lawyer during the black protest movement in the 1930s.
He represented civil rights protesters, albeit reluctantly, but was
ambivalent about post-Brown mass protests. Although Marshall
recognized law‟s limitations, he felt more comfortable using litigation as
a tool for social change. His experiences as a legal advocate for racial
equality influenced his thinking as a judge.
Marshall joined the United States Supreme Court in 1967, as
dramatic advancement of black civil rights through litigation waned.
Other social movements, notably the women‟s rights movement, took its
place. The push for women‟s equality had garnered some success in
Congress, but the enforcement and scope of these protections became a
focus of litigation in the 1970s and 1980s. While on the Court, Marshall
played an important role in the advancement of women‟s equality, yet a
few cases suggest he struggled when the interests of race and gender
equality seemed to directly clash. This paper considers the ways in which
Marshall‟s role as a participant and lawyer in the black civil rights
movement influenced his thinking about gender equality. While his
record on women‟s equality is very strong, Marshall‟s position in three
cases indicates that he believed institution concerns sometimes trumped
otherwise valid gender equality claims.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Thurgood Marshall, the renowned civil rights lawyer, came of age as
a lawyer during the black protest movement in the 1930s.1 He was an
important force during the twentieth century black civil rights movement
(the Movement) and was appointed to the United States Supreme Court
as the Movement was ending.2 For more than half of the twentieth
century, black lawyers like Marshall and his mentor, Charles Hamilton
Houston, used the federal courts as the primary vehicle to pursue equal
rights for black Americans.3 The Movement is remarkable because ―a
relatively powerless group‖ challenged, and successfully thwarted, a
system of laws and practices that condoned unequal treatment based
solely on race.4
Not only did the Supreme Court‘s seminal decision in Brown v.
Board of Education signal the end of legally sanctioned racial
segregation,5 it also triggered a shift in the Movement as young black
Americans increasingly employed nonviolent public protests in their
push for the legal and social changes Brown seemed to promise.6 This
1

Marshall was involved in NAACP-sponsored social protests in his hometown
of Baltimore—economic boycotts and picketing—including Baltimore‘s Buy
Where You Work Campaign. See legal historian Kenneth Mack‘s discussion of
the involvement of black lawyers, including Marshall, in the black boycott
movements of the early 1930s, including the ―Don‘t Buy‖ boycotts. Kenneth W.
Mack, Rethinking Civil Rights Lawyering and Politics in the Era Before Brown,
115 YALE L.J. 256, 318–28 (2005). While still practicing in Baltimore, he and
his wife marched and attended meetings between local NAACP representatives
and business people. JUAN WILLIAMS, THURGOOD MARSHALL: AMERICAN
REVOLUTIONARY 72–73 (1998). Later Marshall remarked that economic
boycotts were ―a ‗double-edged‘ sword—not a good tool to protest
segregation—because segregationists could also boycott black businesses.‖ Id.
at 241.
2
See infra notes 15–16 and accompanying text.
3
See generally Mack, supra note 1.
4
Aldon D. Morris, A Retrospective on the Civil Rights Movement: Political and
Intellectual Landmarks, 25 ANN. REV. SOCIOL. 517, 523 (1999).
5
347 U.S. 483 (1954).
6
BLACK PROTEST: HISTORY, DOCUMENTS, AND ANALYSES 251 (Joanne Grant
ed., 2d ed. 1968). (―The style of the Negro protest movement changed . . . with
the large-scale use of the technique of non-violent resistance. Other methods of
protest were by no means abandoned, but a qualitative change took place when
the youth shifted the emphasis from the slow process of court suits to direct
confrontations.‖) Following the success of the 1955 Montgomery Bus Boycott,
civil rights leaders like the Rev. Martin Luther King, Jr. asked Americans to
engage in non-violent public protests. See generally FRED D. GRAY, BUS RIDE
TO JUSTICE: CHANGING THE SYSTEM BY THE SYSTEM (1995). The courts played
a role in the boycott‘s success by declaring racial segregation on public buses
unconstitutional. Gayle v. Browder, 352 U.S. 903 (1956) (mem.) (per curiam),
aff‟g 142 F. Supp. 707 (M.D. Ala. 1956). ―The Montgomery bus boycott
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shift in protest methods changed the role of civil rights lawyers from
leading strategists to secondary advisers and reactive counsels. As the
Movement transitioned from courtroom to street protest, Marshall
represented the early civil rights protesters, albeit reluctantly.7 He was
ambivalent about the post-Brown public protests,8 fearing that protests in
the Deep South would trigger white violence—which they did.9
revealed that large numbers of Blacks—indeed an entire community—could be
mobilized to protest racial segregation. . . . [And] that protest could be sustained
indefinitely . . . .‖ Aldon D. Morris, A Retrospective on the Civil Rights
Movement: Political and Intellectual Landmarks, 23 ANN. REV. SOC. 517, 524
(1999). Television also played an important role, providing Americans, and the
world, with an unparalleled window through which to watch, in real time,
America‘s waging of the war in Vietnam, Southern governments‘ mistreatment
of peaceful protesters challenging unjust racial segregation laws, and mass
public protests highlighting inequalities in almost every aspect of American life.
See, e.g., JAMES L. BAUGHMAN, THE REPUBLIC OF MASS CULTURE:
JOURNALISM, FILMMAKING, AND BROADCASTING IN AMERICA SINCE 1941, at
109–10 (2d ed. 1997); ROBERT J. DONOVAN & RAY SCHERER, UNSILENT
REVOLUTION: TELEVISION NEWS AND AMERICAN PUBLIC LIFE (1992); SASHA
TORRES, BLACK, WHITE AND IN COLOR: TELEVISION AND BLACK CIVIL RIGHTS
(2003).
7
HOWARD BALL, A DEFIANT LIFE: THURGOOD MARSHALL AND THE
PERSISTENCE OF RACISM IN AMERICA 155 (1998) (―‗Even though Thurgood
disagreed with our techniques, . . . he would make available the legal expertise
and the legal resources of the [NAACP LDF] . . . .‘‖ (quoting John Lewis)); see
Garner v. Louisiana, 368 U.S. 157 (1961) (upholding the right of sit-in
demonstrators; Garner was the last case Marshall litigated before joining the
judiciary).
8
CARL T. ROWAN, DREAM MAKERS, DREAM BREAKERS: THE WORLD OF
JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL 434 (1993) (describing Marshall‘s reaction to
the effect of the bus boycott, ―Marshall noted to me that it finally took a
Supreme Court decision to get blacks to the front of the bus. ‗All that walking
for nothing . . . . They might as well have waited for the Court decision.‘‖).
9
Commenting on the protests over the murder of Emmett Till, a young Chicago
teenager killed in Mississippi for allegedly whistling at a white woman,
Marshall said that ―marching to protest racism in Mississippi . . . created a
situation where angry segregationist mobs would attack marchers, who would
then fight back, and ‗violence has never been an answer to violence.‘ ‖
WILLIAMS, supra note 1, at 241. For examples of violence triggered by nonviolent protests by civil rights activists, see Cynthia McKinley, Birmingham
Children‟s Crusade, APPLESEEDS, Feb. 2008, at 18, 18 (―As more students
continued marching, tense police met the protestors with force. They turned fire
hoses on young people with enough power to roll girls down the street and strip
bark from trees. Police dogs attacked demonstrators and ripped clothing from
children‘s backs. Some adults who hadn‘t been trained in nonviolence shouted
at the officers. Some threw rocks and bottles. The police showed no mercy and
continued to cart children off to jail. Some were only 6 years old.‖); Wayne A.
Santoro, The Civil Rights Movement and the Right to Vote: Black Protest,
Segregationist Violence and the Audience, 86 SOC. FORCES 1391, 1394 (2008)
(―Segregationists murdered individuals active in protest, . . . . [A]ctivists were
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Moreover, Marshall respected the rule of law and thus abhorred civil
disobedience as a tactic to bring about social change.10
The second phase of the Movement was relatively short.11 The mass
protests of the early 1960s triggered congressional action, notably the
1964 Civil Rights Act12 and the 1965 Voting Rights Act.13 By the late
1960s black Americans had greater political clout and did not need the
courts as much. Although its heyday was past, the Movement had
become ―a model for other protest movements‖ in the United States and
the world.14
President Lyndon Johnson announced Marshall‘s nomination to the
Court on June 13, 1967,15 the day after the Court in Loving v. Virginia,
struck down Virginia‘s anti-miscegenation law, the last major vestige of
more concerned with how to endure, respond to and publicize [violence].
Referring to the Selma campaign, Andrew Young‘s comment is informative:
‗Sheriff Clark has been beating black heads in the back of the jail on Saturday
night for years, and we‘re only saying to him that if he still wants to beat heads
he‘ll have to do it on Main Street at noon in front of CBS, NBC and ABC
television cameras.‘ ‖ (citation omitted)).
10
BALL, supra note 7, at 154. (―Although he believed that King ‗came at the
right time,‘ Marshall had ‗lots of fights with Martin about his theory about
disobeying the law‘: ‗I didn‘t believe in that. I thought you did have a right to
disobey a law, and you also had a right to go to jail for it.‘ ‖). Marshall probably
believed the rhetoric articulated by black lawyers of an earlier period that blacks
must act ―respectably‖ to prove that they are worthy of equal citizenship.
Kenneth Mack writes that pre-Brown black lawyers looked for ―respectable
plaintiffs‖—individuals, professionals, or others who bore a ―cultural
resemblance to the most educated whites‖—when bringing civil rights lawsuits.
Mack, supra note 1, at 295. In the mid 1920s Raymond Pace Alexander, a
prominent black Philadelphia lawyer, spelled out this philosophy: ― ‗we must
study and train up to that standard . . . we must—of necessity ape the white
man—or consider him our preceptor, if only for the selfish purpose of gaining
what he has to give us or teach us . . . .‘ Before both audiences, in short,
Alexander framed desegregation in terms of the internal cultural work that
African-Americans needed to do, and were doing, as the centerpiece for claims
to equal citizenship.‖ Id. at 283 (citing Raymond Pace Alexander, A Challenge
to North Philadelphia Men, Address Before the A.M.E. Church, at add. 6 (Feb.
7, 1926) (on file with RPAP, Box 95)).
11
The assassinations of Martin Luther King and Robert Kennedy in 1968
probably signaled the end of the Movement. Any questions about the demise of
black civil rights political currency ended when the Court decided Palmer v.
Thompson, 403 U.S. 217 (1971), permitting the City of Jackson, Mississippi, to
close its public swimming pools rather than integrate them, fearing loss of
revenue.
12
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a–2000a-6 (2006).
13
42 U.S.C. §§ 1973a–q (2006).
14
Morris, supra note 6, at 523–24.
15
Williams, supra note 1, at 334.
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the racial apartheid era.16 That same year, President Johnson issued
Executive Order 11,375, which extended affirmative action to women
and outlawed sex discrimination in federal employment and in
companies with federal contracts.17 Three years earlier, Congress had
enacted a comprehensive civil rights bill that, among other things,
prohibited discrimination in employment based on race, color, religion,
national origin, or sex and created the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC).18 Equal rights for women—the elimination of
gender apartheid—rather than racial equality would soon occupy the
Supreme Court‘s agenda.
As a result of his experiences, Marshall, like other Movement
lawyers, formed strong ideas about the rule of law and equality under the
law. He brought those ideas with him to the Supreme Court.19 According
to one study, between 1971, when the Court in Reed v. Reed invalidated
16

388 U.S. 1 (1967) (decided June 12, 1967).
Exec. Order No. 11,375, 32 Fed. Reg. 14,303 (Oct. 13, 1967). This formal
recognition of women‘s inequality in the workplace was a direct outgrowth of
the 1963 Report of the President‟s Commission on the Status of American
Women commissioned by President John F. Kennedy. See Exec. Order No.
10,980, 26 Fed. Reg. 12,059 (Dec. 14, 1961) (creating the President‘s
Commission on the Status of Women and instructing it to ―make
recommendations as needed for constructive action in . . . [e]mployment policies
and practices, including those on wages, under Federal contracts.‖). The
documented pay inequality between women and men contained in that report
prompted enactment of the Equal Pay Act of 1963, which promised equal pay to
women doing substantially the same jobs as men. Pub. L. No. 88-38, § 2(a), 77
Stat. 56. Most women in the workplace, however, were consigned to sex
segregated jobs as nurses, secretaries, or domestic workers, and would not
benefit from the measure. RORY DICKER, A HISTORY OF U.S. FEMINISMS 68–69
(2008). In 1966, the National Organization for Women (NOW), an advocacy
group for women‘s equality, was founded. National Organization for Women,
The Founding of NOW, http://www.now.org/history/the_founding.html (last
visited Jan. 20, 2010).
18
Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, tit. VII, 78 Stat. 241, 253; id. at
§ 705, 78 Stat. 258 (creating the EEOC). Ironically, the addition of sex to Title
VII was intended to defeat the measure. Representative Howard Smith (D-Va.),
a segregationist, introduced this addition to the bill, thinking that equal
employment for women was so ―laughable‖ it would result in the measure‘s
defeat, but Congresswoman Martha Griffiths (D-Mich.) ―organized a coalition
that [fought] for the passage of Title VII‖ and the Civil Rights Act of 1964 as a
whole. DICKER, supra note 17, at 69. But to some extent Representative Smith
was right, for ―even though the commission received thousands of complaints
about sex discrimination in its first year, the EEOC did not take these cases
seriously, concentrating instead on race-based grievances.‖ Id. The EEOC‘s
hostility to sex discrimination claims is exemplified by the Commission‘s ruling
upholding ―the legality of sex-segregated want ads in 1966.‖ Id.
19
MARK V. TUSHNET, MAKING CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: THURGOOD MARSHALL
AND THE SUPREME COURT, 1961–1991, at 99–101 (1997).
17
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on equal protection grounds a state law preferring men over women as
administrators for estates,20 and 2002, the Supreme Court decided fortyone cases involving gender employment discrimination claims.21 Most of
these cases were decided while Marshall was on the bench. Yet when
scholars discuss Marshall‘s jurisprudence on the Court, gender equality
outside the context of racial equality is seldom, if ever, mentioned.
At first glance Marshall seems to have treated gender and race
discrimination claims similarly because most early gender discrimination
claims mirrored race discrimination claims—a point he often made in his
opinions.22 When Marshall announced his retirement from the bench in
1991, he had voted ―favorably‖ on ninety-two percent of the
employment sex discrimination cases before the Court during his
tenure—one percent more than Justice Brennan.23 Still, gender and race
claims are sometimes in tension with each other. This article explores
how Justice Marshall responded when faced with situations in which the
goal of racial equality seemed to conflict with the goal of gender
equality.
While the Movement championed equal rights, it focused on the
advancement of black Americans as a racialized group. Although civil
rights organizations relied heavily on the work of women, black and
white, they denied them meaningful leadership power.24 Further, many
black churches that supported the Movement, especially those in the
Deep South, saw equality between the sexes as inconsistent with biblical
teachings.25 Thus, while the Movement‘s success might have inspired
20

404 U.S. 71 (1971).
Vicki Lens, Supreme Court Narratives on Equality and Gender
Discrimination in Employment: 1971–2002, 10 CARDOZO WOMEN‘S L.J. 501,
523 (2004).
22
See, e.g., Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 74 (1986) (Marshall, J.,
concurring in the judgment). Marshall agreed with the majority‘s analogizing
sexual harassment to racial harassment in the workplace, but he was troubled
because the Court refused to impute the supervisor‘s actions to the employee as
it had in Title VII race discrimination cases. He ―would apply in this case the
same rules we apply in all other Title VII cases, and hold that sexual harassment
by a supervisor of an employee under his supervision, leading to a
discriminatory work environment, should be imputed to the employer for Title
VII purposes regardless of whether the employee gave ‗notice‘ of the offense.‖
Id. at 78.
23
Lens, supra note 21, at 525. It is ironic that ―[t]he two female justices on the
Court, Sandra Day O‘Connor and Ruth Bader Ginsberg, voted the pro-feminist
position 71% and 85% of the time.‖ Id. Lens never defines what she means by
―pro-feminist‖ position.
24
See DEAR SISTERS: DISPATCHES FROM THE WOMEN‘S LIBERATION MOVEMENT
21 (Rosalyn Baxandall & Linda Gordon eds., 2000) [hereinafter DEAR SISTERS].
25
See DAPHNE C. WIGGINS, RIGHTEOUS CONTENT: BLACK WOMEN‘S
PERSPECTIVES OF CHURCH AND FAITH 68 (2005); DELORES S. WILLIAMS,
21
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advocates for women‘s rights, its articulated goals were not necessarily
consistent with demands for gender equality.
Given this reality, Marshall‘s position on gender equality while on
the Court is worth exploring to determine whether the great race man
was able to reconcile some of the inherent tensions created when gender
claims seemed to conflict with racial interests.26 This article looks at
Marshall‘s judicial record in three cases in which the Court rejected
gender discrimination claims when the interests of a racialized group
seemed to conflict with aims of gender equality. Marshall wrote the
majority opinion in two of these cases, Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez27
and Florida Star v. B.J.F.,28 and failed to join a concurring opinion in the
third, Alexander v. Louisiana.29 The next section briefly discusses
Marshall‘s general attitudes toward gender equality before examining the
potentially troubling inferences these cases raise about whether his stand
on the issue was consistent with his equalitarian principles.
II. MARSHALL AND GENDER EQUALITY
Philosophically Marshall was an equalitarian and assimilationist
whose notion of a transformed America was a society where everyone,
without regard to prior legal disabilities such as race and gender, has
equal opportunity to education, employment, housing, and government
benefits. In many ways Marshall was a conventional New Deal liberal
lawyer-jurist who embraced American middle class norms. Yet his
experiences as a black American male growing up in the Jim Crow South
and as a Movement lawyer undoubtedly influenced his attitudes about
the meaning of equality under the Constitution. Since his jurisprudence
was shaped by these experiences, it is unsurprising that he was
―particularly devoted to advancing the interests of [black] Americans.‖30
Nevertheless, there is evidence to suggest that his vision of ―equal
protection of the laws‖ transcended race.

SISTERS IN THE WILDERNESS: THE CHALLENGE OF WOMANIST GOD-TALK 242
(1993).
26
See Sheryll D. Cashin, Justice Thurgood Marshall: A Race Man‟s RaceTranscending Jurisprudence, 52 HOW. L.J. 507, 507 (2009) (―In common
parlance, a race man or race woman is simply someone ‗whose identity [is]
clearly defined as [b]lack,‘ and who acts to bring about the progression of black
people.‖ (quoting Richard McCulloch, The Burden of the New “Race Man,”
THE BROWARD TIMES, Feb. 16, 2007) (alterations in original)). See generally
HAZEL V. CARBY, RACE MEN (1998) (exploring black male archetypes of the
past century).
27
436 U.S. 49 (1978).
28
491 U.S. 524 (1989).
29
405 U.S. 625 (1972).
30
TUSHNET, MAKING CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 19, at 180–81.
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In 1960 Kenyans working toward their forthcoming independence
from Britain invited Marshall to advise them during negotiations on their
new country‘s constitution.31 Mary Dudziak, writing about this
experience, argues that Marshall considered equality, as opposed to
liberty, the foundation upon which all other rights are grounded.32
Equality was so important to Marshall that his draft preamble to the bill
of rights read, ―All persons are equal before the law . . . and are entitled
without any disorimination [sic] or distinction of any kind, such as race,
colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or
social origin, property, birth or other status, to equal protection of the
law.‖33 But no reaffirming prohibition of sex discrimination appeared in
the body of the bill of rights.34
Marshall seemed to practice what he preached. In 1945 as General
Counsel at the Legal Defense Fund (LDF), he hired Marian Wynn Perry,
a white woman, as a staff attorney.35 He hired Constance Baker Motley,
a black third-year law student at Columbia Law School, later that year as
a law clerk, and upon her graduation as an LDF lawyer.36 These hires
31

Mary L. Dudziak, Thurgood Marshall‟s Bill of Rights for Kenya, 11 GREEN
BAG 2D 307, 309–10 (2008). See generally MARY L. DUDZIAK, EXPORTING
AMERICAN DREAMS: THURGOOD MARSHALL‘S AFRICAN JOURNEY (2008).
32
Dudziak, supra note 31, at 311.
33
Id. at 310–11.
34
The draft bill of rights prohibits discrimination based solely on
―religion, race, descent or place of birth in any law or in the
appointment to any office of employment under a public
authority or in the administration of any law relating to the
acquisition, holding or disposition of property or the
establishing or carrying on of any trade, business, profession,
vocation or employment.‖
Id. at 312. Unfortunately, most of Marshall‘s suggestions were absent from the
final document. Id. at 315.
35
ROBERT L. CARTER, A MATTER OF LAW 59 (2005). Perry resigned in 1949
when her husband got a new job in upstate New York. MARK V. TUSHNET,
MAKING CIVIL RIGHTS LAW: THURGOOD MARSHALL AND THE SUPREME COURT,
1936–1961, at 35 (1994).
36
CARTER, supra note 35, at 59. Upon her graduation in June 1946, Motley
joined LDF full-time as a ―Legal Research Assistant.‖ Id. Carter writes only that
Marshall hired Motley full time when she graduated, but Motley in a later
memorandum to Marshall indicates that she was hired as a Legal Research
Assistant. Memorandum from Constance Baker Motley to Thurgood Marshall,
May 25, 1949, NAACP Papers, Library of Congress, Box H-B-101, file:
Motley, Constance Baker, 1949055; see also GENNA RAE MCNEIL,
GROUNDWORK: CHARLES HAMILTON HOUSTON AND THE STRUGGLE FOR CIVIL
RIGHTS 200 (1985) (―Motley . . . recall[ed] that she came in 1945 to the Inc.
Fund to work as a clerk but found the work and the cause so much to her liking
that she stayed on as a staff lawyer.‖). When Motley was admitted to the New
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were extraordinary statements at a time when women comprised less
than two percent of all lawyers and found it difficult to obtain
employment as lawyers.37 Marshall‘s employment practices continued
when he was elevated to the Supreme Court: during his tenure on the
Court, roughly one-quarter of his clerks were women.38
Marshall came to the Court with a fully developed notion of equality
that, at a general level, included women. Before he joined it in 1967, the
Court upheld laws that relied on biological distinctions to discriminate
against women, especially in the workplace and other sectors of public
life.39 Starting with Reed v. Reed in 1971, however, the Court began to
more closely scrutinize laws that treated women differently.40 When
gender discrimination claims came before the Court, Marshall was the
only member of the Court who argued for a coherent approach to gender
and other equal protection claims.41

York Bar, Marshall promoted her to ―Legal Assistant,‖ and later the same year
to ―Assistant Special Counsel.‖ CARTER, supra note 35, at 58–59.
37
See CYNTHIA FUCHS EPSTEIN, WOMEN IN LAW 4 tbl. I.2 (2d ed. 1993) (listing
the percentage of practicing women lawyers in the United States as 1.8% in
1948 and 2.5% in 1951).
38
Between 1967 and 1991, 22 of Marshall‘s 85 law clerks were women. During
the same period only 8 of Brennan‘s clerks were women. While Brennan hired
his first female clerk in 1974, Marshall hired his first in 1971. Law Clerk Report
by Term, 1967–1991. Justice O‘Connor hired at least one female law clerk every
year between her appointment in 1981 and Marshall‘s retirement in 1991.
Eighteen of her 44 clerks during this period were women. During the same
period 13 of Marshall‘s 44 clerks were women. In only one year during this
period—1982—did Marshall not hire a woman law clerk. Data supplied by the
U.S. Supreme Court Library, July 1, 2008 (copy on file with the author).
39
See, e.g., Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908) (upholding state law limiting
the number of hours women could work based on biological differences
between women and men); Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948) (upholding
a law prohibiting women from working as bartenders unless employed by father
or husband); Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57 (1961) (holding that excluding
women from jury service unless they volunteer is not unconstitutional).
40
See Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971) (striking down state law that preferred
males over females as administrators of intestate estates).
41
Cass Sunstein writes that ―Marshall thought . . . the core meaning of the Equal
Protection Clause was that the government could not translate morally irrelevant
differences into a form of second-class citizenship. It could not take skin color,
or gender, and turn these into social disadvantages for blacks or women.‖ Cass
Sunstein, On Marshall‟s Conception of Equality, 44 STAN. L. REV. 1267, 1270
(1992) (citing Marshall‘s dissents in Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 86
(1981) and Personnel Adm‘r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 281 (1979)).
Sunstein writes that ―Marshall was the most vigorous voice of opposition, under
the Equal Protection Clause, to official practices connected to the exclusion of
women from the military; he insisted that this exclusion was part and parcel of
women‘s second-class citizenship.‖ Id. at 1270 n.18 (citing Marshall‘s dissent in
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With the exception of unequal treatment based on pregnancy, the
Court was generally receptive toward gender-based employment
discrimination claims.42 The Court‘s deafness regarding employment
practices that discriminated against pregnant women43 prompted
Congress in 1978 to enact the Pregnancy Discrimination Act (PDA),
which required employers to treat pregnancy like any other temporary
disability.44 Marshall, writing the majority opinion in California Federal
Savings & Loan v. Guerra, a case testing the limits of the PDA,
emphasized that the real interest at stake was the economic security of
women who became pregnant.45 Employer-provided health benefits that
Feeney, 442 U.S. at 285). The courts‘ role must be to thwart governmentsponsored disabilities whose purpose or effect creates a caste system through a
―careful scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause.‖ Id. at 1271–73.
42
See generally Lens, supra note 21.
43
In 1974 a majority of the Court in Geduldig v. Aiello, an equal protection
case, upheld an employee health plan that denied pregnant women
compensation when they lost time at work due to normal pregnancy while
providing compensation to male employees for gender-related procedures like
prostatectomies and circumcision. Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 501 (1974)
(Brennan, J., dissenting, joined by Douglas, J., and Marshall, J.) (describing the
majority opinion‘s result). The Court justified the exclusion of normal
pregnancy, saying that there was no equal protection question because ―[t]here
is no risk from which men are protected and women are not. Likewise, there is
no risk from which women are protected and men are not.‖ Id. at 496–97. The
majority added in a footnote:
[T]he lack of identity between the excluded disability and
gender . . . becomes clear upon the most cursory analysis. The
program divides potential recipients into two groups—
pregnant women and nonpregnant persons. While the first
group is exclusively female, the second includes members of
both sexes. The fiscal and actuarial benefits of the program
thus accrue to members of both sexes.
Id. at 497 note 20. Two years later, in General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, a majority
of the Court ruled that an employer who refused to provide health benefits to
women for disabilities arising from pregnancy did not violate Title VII because
the benefits plan was ―facially nondiscriminatory,‖ citing the Court‘s equal
protection language in Geduldig. Gen. Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 138
(1976). Geduldig and Gilbert illustrate the limitations of sameness feminism in
addressing gender inequality in the workplace, because women are biologically
different from men.
44
Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-555, tit. 7, 92 Stat.
2076 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2000)).
45
See Cal. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass‘n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272 (1987). A provision
of the California Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA) provided that
employees temporarily disabled by pregnancy could obtain an unpaid leave of
up to four months, with guaranteed reinstatement in their original job or its
equivalent. See CAL. GOV‘T CODE § 12945(b)(2) (2005). This law was
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excluded pregnancy coverage made it harder for pregnant women to
avoid financial impoverishment and might have permanently consigned
some to an economic underclass and second-class status based solely on
an aspect of gender.
Marshall‘s appreciation of gender-based employment discrimination
probably stemmed from his childhood experiences. He saw his mother
struggle to obtain a full-time position as a public school teacher in
Baltimore, Maryland, when she became the primary breadwinner for his
family.46 Historically, more black women than white worked outside the
home.47 As was the case with Marshall‘s mother, their income was
necessary to the survival of black families because of black males‘
chronic unemployment and low wages.48 These women were
beneficiaries of the California Federal decision.
Marshall‘s personal experiences as an employer also helped him
appreciate the connection between a woman‘s ability to control
reproduction and maintain employment. When Constance Baker Motley
was pregnant during the 1950s, Marshall ignored an NAACP policy
requiring pregnant women to take a leave of absence starting with the
sixth month of pregnancy; Motley worked until the week before she gave
challenged before the Court as ―special treatment‖ not required by the more
general language of the PDA. Marshall, writing for the majority, refused to
strike down the provision, reasoning that the California law did not require
employers to give pregnant women ―special treatment,‖ but rather required
employers only to provide pregnant women employees with equal opportunities
and this included providing minimum health benefits for pregnancy. Guerra,
479 U.S. at 284, 291.
46
When Marshall left Baltimore to work in the NAACP‘s legal office in New
York, his mother, Norma, a public school teacher in Baltimore, became the
primary source of income for herself; Marshall‘s father, Willie; and Marshall‘s
sick brother, Aubrey. Baltimore, like other Maryland school districts, paid black
teachers up to forty percent less than white teachers. According to his
biographer, Juan Williams, Marshall ―took it personally that his mother‘s work
was valued less than a white teacher‘s,‖ and successfully challenged this policy
in court. WILLIAMS, supra note 1, at 89–90. Marshall brought equal pay suits in
other states, including a case in Norfolk, Virginia, that the Supreme Court let
stand. This victory in Virginia, which ―the NAACP used . . . as a precedent . . .
around the country‖ was ―a personal one . . . . [I]t was a victory for his mother
and for the regular paycheck his family needed so badly.‖ Id. at 90–91.
47
Charlotte Rutherford, African American Women and “Typically Female,”
Low-Wage Jobs: Is Litigation the Answer?, 17 YALE J. INT‘L L. 211, 213–17
(1992) (―In 1890, nearly thirty years after the end of slavery, 40% of all African
American females worked outside the home, compared to only 12.5% of all
white females.‖).
48
JACQUELINE JONES, LABOR OF LOVE, LABOR OF SORROW: BLACK WOMEN,
WORK, AND THE FAMILY FROM SLAVERY TO THE PRESENT 160–61 (1985)
(studying the changes in the patterns of black women‘s work as slaves and wage
earners).
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birth.49 No doubt this was a pragmatic move, given LDF‘s small staff
and heavy caseload, but Motley saw a connection. She later wrote:
All the other women were clerical or semi-professionals
and, if pregnant, had left long before the ninth month. I
set a new standard for women with Marshall‘s tacit
approval. Thus, there was a big smile on my face when I
read Marshall‘s opinion for the court on pregnancy
leaves and Title VII in California Federal Savings and
Loan v. Guerra.50
In gender-based employment discrimination cases, Marshall may have
been thinking of how the Court‘s decisions would impact the lives of
black working women and their families. The three sex discrimination
cases discussed in the next section do not involve employment
discrimination. Marshall‘s troublesome position in these cases is
attributable to other experiences living and working under racial
apartheid laws.
III. THREE TROUBLESOME CASES
A. ALEXANDER V. LOUISIANA: JURY EXCLUSION
When Marshall joined the Court, women were routinely excluded
from jury service.51 Courts advanced sexist reasons for ―shielding‖ white
women from jury service, such as men‘s desire to protect white women
from the dirtiness of the outside world, and consigned them to home and
hearth.52 In contrast, starting in 1880 the Supreme Court condemned
race-based jury exclusion, a problem for black men dating back to the
Reconstruction Era,53 but states persisted in denying black men access to
jury panels.54 On the surface, sex-based jury exclusion laws and
practices, like employment discrimination practices, often mimicked race
discrimination practices. Yet the underlying reasons for race and gender
exclusions differed. While the exclusion of white women suggests a
distrust of their rationality and decision-making ability, the exclusion of
49

See Constance Baker Motley, Tribute, My Personal Debt to Thurgood
Marshall, 101 YALE L.J. 19, 22 (1991).
50
Id.
51
See Shirley S. Sagawa, Batson v. Kentucky: Will It Keep Women on the
Jury?, 3 BERKELEY WOMEN‘S L.J. 14, 24–26 (1987–1988).
52
See id. at 31–32.
53
See Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880).
54
See, e.g., Sims v. Georgia, 389 U.S. 404 (1967); Arnold v. North Carolina,
376 U.S. 773 (1964); Cassell v. Texas, 339 U.S. 282 (1950); Patton v.
Mississippi, 332 U.S. 463 (1947); Pierre v. Louisiana, 306 U.S. 354 (1939);
Hale v. Kentucky, 303 U.S. 613 (1938); Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587
(1935).
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black women is consistent with past and ongoing practices aimed at
denying all black Americans full citizenship rights.
From his years as a litigator in the South, Marshall understood the
jury exclusion problem, at least in terms of race. Thus, unsurprisingly, he
joined the majority in Alexander v. Louisiana, which found the
conviction of a black man for rape by an all-white jury constitutionally
suspect because the jury questionnaires indicated potential jurors‘
races.55 The plaintiff in the case also challenged the absence of women
from his jury as unconstitutional.56 Though Louisiana law contained no
express racial limitations on jury service, it automatically excluded
women from the jury unless they affirmatively submitted a written
declaration of their desire to serve.57 The Court ignored that issue,
however, and focused only on the race discrimination claim.58 In
response, Justice William Douglas filed a separate concurring opinion
chastising the majority for not ruling that the exclusion of women from
the jury also rendered Alexander‘s rape conviction unconstitutional.59
Marshall did not join Douglas‘s opinion. In that same year, however,
he wrote in a plurality opinion that excluding a particular class of
citizens (in that case black Americans) harms not only the defendant but
society as a whole, because the excluded class is denied the right to equal
participation in the administration of justice and is thus stigmatized.60
Marshall‘s reasoning in the racial exclusion case seems to apply equally
to the systematic exclusion of women from jury panels. Thus, at first
blush Marshall‘s failure to join Justice Douglas‘s concurrence in
Alexander seems puzzling.
Three years later, in Taylor v. Louisiana, Marshall voted with the
majority to strike down the same Louisiana law discouraging women‘s

55

Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625, 625 (1972).
Id.
57
Id. at 635 (Douglas, J., concurring).
58
Id. at 634–35 (Douglas, J., concurring).
59
Id. at 635–44 (Douglas, J., concurring).
60
Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493, 499 (1972) (sustaining a white defendant‘s
challenge of his indictment and conviction by an all-white Georgia jury because
of the systematic exclusion of potential black jurors). Marshall rejected the
majority‘s reasoning that Peters did not apply because black men and women
served on the grand jury, just not in leadership positions, because a federal
district judge who ―is supposed to be the very embodiment of evenhanded
justice‖ was responsible for the discriminatory actions. Hobby v. United States,
468 U.S. 339, 353 (1984) (Marshall, J., dissenting). Thus ―the judge who
assumably [sic] discriminated against Negroes and women helped to perpetuate
well-known and vicious stereotypes that our society has been struggling to
erase.‖ Id. at 354.
56
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jury service.61 In later votes and opinions, Marshall supported jury
service for women, writing that the wholesale exclusion of certain
citizens might affect the jury‘s perspective of events62 and that women
comprise a ―distinctive‖ group: to exclude one sex is to lose a viewpoint
from a community.63 According to Marshall, the
truth is that the two sexes are not fungible; a community
made up exclusively of one is different from a
community composed of both; the subtle interplay of
influence one on the other is among the imponderables.
61

Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975) (holding that state law requiring
women to affirmatively request jury service was a denial of the right to a fair
trial).
62
Ford v. Kentucky, 469 U.S. 984, 987 (1984) (Marshall, J., dissenting from
denial of certiorari). Ford, a black male, brought suit alleging that the pool from
which the grand jury was selected did not represent a fair cross-section of the
community, which is required by the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. He claimed that women, young adults, and college students were
underrepresented on the panel. He also claimed that blacks were
underrepresented on the grand jury. For all groups, he claimed they were
underrepresented on the petit jury as well. Ford v. Kentucky, 665 S.W.2d 304
(Ky. 1983).
63
Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 359–60 (1979) (White, J.) (noting that the
Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments give criminal defendants a right to a jury that
is a fair cross-section of the community). Marshall‘s first written statement
about the exclusion of women from the jury came in a case that also included a
claim of racial exclusion. In Hobby v. United States the majority affirmed the
conviction of a white man, despite statistical evidence that blacks and women
were underrepresented among federal grand jury forepersons and deputy
forepersons. 468 U.S. 339 (1984). According to the Court, since blacks and
women served on the grand jury and were only excluded from leadership
positions, the impact of their exclusion was ―minimal and incidental at best.‖ Id.
at 345. In a dissenting opinion, Marshall repeats themes he raised in Peters: that
bias in the selection of jury members injures not only the defendant‘s cause but
the public‘s confidence in the judicial process as well. Id. at 352 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting). He writes:
This diminution of confidence largely stems from a
recognition that the institutions of criminal justice serve
purposes independent of accurate fact finding. [They] also
serve to exemplify, by the manner in which they operate, our
fundamental notions of fairness and our central faith in
democratic norms. They reflect what we demand of ourselves
as a Nation committed to fairness and equality in the
enforcement of the law. That is why discrimination ―is
especially pernicious in the administration of justice,‖ why its
effects constitute an injury ―to the law as an institution,‖ why
its presence must be eradicated root and branch by the most
effective means available.
Id. (footnote omitted).

Fall 2010]

The Race Man and Gender Equality

29

To insulate the courtroom from either may not in a given
case make an iota of difference. Yet a flavor, a distinct
quality is lost if either sex is excluded.64
Marshall, the pragmatist, also used favorable language from the gender
jury discrimination cases to address the continuing problem of de facto
exclusion of blacks from juries.65
Several plausible explanations can be offered for Marshall‘s failure
to join Douglas‘s concurrence in Alexander. The most obvious is his
respect for precedent.66 Marshall understood that the Court‘s respect for
its own precedent was essential to that institution‘s legitimacy, a position
consistent with his philosophy as both a litigator and judge.67

64

469 U.S. at 988 (quoting Ballard v. United States, 329 U.S. 187, 193–94
(1946)). He continues: ―‗Selection of members of a grand jury because they are
of one race and not another destroys the appearance of justice and thereby casts
doubt on the integrity of the judicial process. The exclusion from grand jury
service of Negroes, or any group otherwise qualified to serve, impairs the
confidence of the public in the administration of justice. . . . The injury is not
limited to the defendant—there is injury to the jury system, to the law as an
institution, to the community at large, and to the democratic ideal reflected in
the processes of our courts.‘‖ Id. (quoting Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545, 555–
56 (1979) (quoting Ballard, 329 U.S. at 195)) (alterations in original). He added
that ―[g]iven the potential power of the grand jury over the criminal defendant,
there can be no question that due process requires state grand juries to be
unbiased and impartial.‖ Id. at 987.
65
When the Court in Holland v. Illinois rules that a white criminal defendant
convicted of murder cannot contest the use of peremptory challenges to strike
blacks from the jury as a violation of his right to trial by jury, Marshall dissents.
493 U.S. 474, 490 (1990) (Marshall, J., dissenting). Citing Taylor and Duren,
which guaranteed defendants a fair jury trial, he argues that no groups should be
excluded from the jury. Id. at 494.
66
Dissenting in Payne v. Tennessee, Marshall objected to the majority‘s
overruling two recent death penalty decisions. 501 U.S. 808 (1991). The
majority upheld a state law permitting victim impact statements in capital
murder cases, effectively overruling South Carolina v. Gathers, 490 U.S. 805,
812 (1989) (holding inadmissible statements from the prosecutor at closing
argument about murder victim‘s possessions strewn at murder scene that were
not ―directly related to the circumstances of the crime‖) and Booth v. Maryland,
482 U.S. 496, 501–02 (1987) (holding that the ―Eighth Amendment prohibits a
capital sentencing jury from considering victim impact evidence‖). He writes,
―[F]idelity to precedent is part and parcel of a conception of ‗the judiciary as a
source of impersonal and reasoned judgments.‘‖ Payne, 501 U.S. at 852
(Marshall, J., dissenting). He continues, ―If this Court shows so little respect for
its own precedents, it can hardly expect them to be treated more respectfully by
the state actors whom these decisions are supposed to bind.‖ Id. at 853.
67
Jack Greenberg, writing about Marshall as a litigator at LDF, cites as an
example the LDF brief in Sweatt v. Painter, which while attacking the
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In the jury exclusion cases, the interests of white women and black
Americans, male and female, were arguably not fully compatible.
Marshall‘s considerable experience as a lawyer with juries in the Deep
South may have made him leery of extending jury service to white
women in the South, who he probably believed were likely to be as
biased as their male counterparts. More importantly, extending jury
service to women would not guarantee that black women would serve on
juries in communities where black men were routinely excluded.
Somewhat tellingly, as Shirley Sagawa points out, legal scholarship on
gender discrimination in the use of peremptory challenges focuses
almost exclusively on white women.68 The exclusion of black and other
non-white women from the discussion supports the black feminist
critique that mainstream white feminism ignores the impact of dual
discrimination non-white women experience as a result of their gender
and race.69
Marshall‘s failure to join Douglas‘s concurrence also could be seen
as a pragmatic move. The Alexander ruling reinforced the Court‘s
jurisprudence on the exclusion of blacks from the jury but did so without
adding racially biased white women to the jury pool. Marshall may have
opted to protect black American litigants, male and female, because he
saw their interests in this case as separate and distinct in this instance
from the interests of white women. Still, when a majority of the Court
was willing to squarely address the gender issue, Marshall joined them.
His post-Taylor opinions express strong support for the elimination of
both race and gender discrimination. Thus, while Marshall was not ahead
of the curve with respect to gender jury exclusion, he eventually began to

constitutionality of de jure segregation directly, fell short of arguing that Plessy
v. Ferguson ought to be overruled. JACK GREENBERG, CRUSADERS IN THE
COURTS: LEGAL BATTLES OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT 71 (50th
anniversary ed. 2004). The brief argued that Plessy should only be overruled if
the Court decides it applies to education. Id. Mark Tushnet writes that
Marshall‘s Supreme Court clerks ―had a special responsibility in dealing with
[Marshall‘s] traditionalist streak. Marshall knew that his deepest views were
sometimes different from the more traditional ones he initially expressed, and he
relied on his clerks to remind him when he went astray.‖ TUSHNET, MAKING
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 19, at 59. This situation led to difficulties if
―the clerk responsible for a case agreed with Marshall‘s initial impulses and
began working on an opinion that, in the end, Marshall rejected . . . [because it]
supported an opinion that Marshall knew in his heart he should not have taken.‖
Id. at 59–60.
68
Sagawa, supra note 51, at 36 n.162.
69
Id. Yet another explanation is that there was a distinction between black
exclusion and an exemption for women, even though the impact of the opt-in
provision was almost the same. If exclusion from the jury denied black men
citizenship rights, then surely presumptive exemption for women operated the
same way.
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equate gender with race discrimination in this area. His position in the
next problematic case can be similarly rationalized.
B. SANTA CLARA PUEBLO V. MARTINEZ: TRIBAL MEMBERSHIP
The Supreme Court‘s ruling in Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez
triggered a flood of law review articles by feminists who criticized the
opinion and Indian law legal scholars who approved it.70 Most articles do
not focus on Thurgood Marshall‘s role in the case. Marshall, who
authored more Indian law opinions than any other Justice on the Court at
the time,71 wrote the opinion.
The conflict in Martinez was intra-tribal, pitting a Pueblo woman
against the power of her tribe to determine its members. Mrs. Julia
Martinez, a tribal member, and her daughter, Audrey Martinez,
70

See, e.g., Ann E. Tweedy, Indian Law: Sex Discrimination Under Tribal Law,
36 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 392 (2010); Shefali Milczarek-Desai, (Re)Locating
Other/Third World Women: An Alternative Approach to Santa Clara Pueblo v.
Martinez‟s Construction of Gender, Culture and Identity, 13 UCLA WOMEN‘S
L.J. 235 (2005); Stacy L. Leeds, Decision and Order of the American Indian
Nations Supreme Court for Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 14 KAN. J.L. & PUB.
POL‘Y 91 (2004); Rina Swentzell, Testimony of a Santa Clara Woman, 14 KAN.
J.L. & PUB. POL‘Y 97 (2004); Bethany R. Berger, Indian Policy and the
Imagined Indian Woman, 14 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 103 (2004); Francine R.
Skenandore, Comment, Revisiting Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez: Feminist
Perspectives on Tribal Sovereignty, 17 WIS. WOMEN‘S L.J. 347 (2002); Lucy A.
Curry, A Closer Look at Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez: Membership by Sex, by
Race, and by Tribal Tradition, 16 WIS. WOMEN‘S L.J. 161 (2001); Christina D.
Ferguson, Comment, Martinez v. Santa Clara Pueblo: A Modern Day Lesson on
Tribal Sovereignty, 46 ARK. L. REV. 275 (1993); Carla Christofferson, Tribal
Courts‟ Failure to Protect Native American Women: A Reevalutaion of the
Indian Civil Rights Act, 101 YALE L.J. 169 (1991); Angela P. Harris, Race and
Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 581, 592–96 (1990);
Robert C. Jeffrey, The Indian Civil Rights Act and the Martinez Decision: A
Reconsideration, 35 S.D. L. REV. 355 (1990); Judith Resnik, Dependent
Sovereigns: Indian Tribes, States, and the Federal Courts, 56 U. CHI. L. REV.
671 (1989); Catharine A. MacKinnon, Whose Culture? A Case Note on
Martinez v. Santa Clara Pueblo, in FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON
LIFE AND LAW 63 (1987); Alison Bernstein, A Mixed Record: The Political
Enfranchisement of American Indian Women During the Indian New Deal, 23 J.
OF THE WEST 13 (1984); Dennis R. Holmes, Political Rights Under the Indian
Civil Rights Act, 24 S.D. L. REV. 419 (1979); Alvin J. Ziontz, After Martinez:
Civil Rights Under Tribal Governments, 12 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1 (1979).
71
N. Bruce Duthu, The Thurgood Marshall Papers and the Quest for a
Principled Theory of Tribal Sovereignty: Fueling the Fires of Tribal/State
Conflict, 21 VT. L. REV. 47, 65 (1996). The Court‘s inability or unwillingness to
develop a ―principled theory of tribal sovereignty,‖ coupled with shifting federal
policies toward Native Americans, resulted in the increased number and
importance of Indian law cases in the 1970s and 1980s. Id. at 62–64.
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challenged a tribal ordinance as discriminatory because it denied tribal
membership to the children of female, but not male, members who
married outside the tribe.72 On the surface, the case asked whether
respect for tribal self-governance and sovereignty, even if grounded in a
patriarchal culture, trumps equal treatment of women members. Like
black Americans, who for almost a century fought to fully participate in
their country as citizens, Mrs. Martinez wanted her children to be full
participants in the Pueblo community.73
The trial judge, in refusing to strike down the ordinance on equal
protection grounds, wrote that ―[t]o abrogate tribal decisions, particularly
in the delicate area of membership, for whatever ‗good‘ reasons, is to
destroy cultural identity under the guise of saving it.‖74 The Court of
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reversed, reasoning that the Pueblo failed
to articulate a compelling tribal interest to justify a sex-based tribal
ordinance that treated women differently from male members of the
tribe.75 While there is evidence that the Supreme Court Justices seriously
considered the Tenth Circuit‘s argument,76 in the end the Court
reaffirmed the trial judge‘s reliance on principles of tribal selfgovernment.77
72

Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 51 (1978). See Martinez v.
Romney, 402 F. Supp. 5, 15–16 (D.N.M. 1975) (explaining that the interests of
the tribal ordinance were ―social, and to an extent, psychological and cultural
self-definition‖ and ―economic survival of the tribal unit‖). Martinez sued the
Santa Clara Pueblo government and its governor, claiming that the tribal
ordinance discriminated against women in violation of Title I the Indian Civil
Rights Act of 1968 (ICRA). 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301–1303 (2006). The ICRA
provides that ―[n]o Indian tribe in exercising powers of self-government
shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of its
laws . . . .‖ 25 U.S.C. § 1302(8) (2006). The federal district court ruled it had
jurisdiction to hear the suit but dismissed the equal protection claim, reasoning
that the clause did not reach tribal law. Martinez, 402 F. Supp. at 18 (D.N.M.
1975).
73
Among the rights conferred by tribal membership were the right to vote in
tribal elections and reside in the Pueblo, along with land use rights, including
hunting, fishing, and water rights. Martinez, 436 U.S. at 52–53. These were
civic rights. Martinez also claimed that the ordinance discriminated against
individuals based on ancestry. She married a Navajo Indian two years after the
ordinance was passed. Id at 52.
74
Martinez, 402 F. Supp. at 19 (emphasis added). The judge also determined
that the ordinance, enacted two years before Mrs. Martinez married, ―reflect[ed]
traditional values of patriarchy still significant in tribal life . . . and . . . basic to
the tribe‘s survival as a cultural and economic entity.‖ Martinez, 436 U.S. at 54
(citing Martinez, 402 F. Supp. at 15). Preservation of culture was important
since the Santa Clara Pueblo was a small tribe consisting of fewer than 1,500
members. Martinez, 402 F. Supp. at 12.
75
Martinez v. Santa Clara Pueblo, 540 F.2d 1039, 1047–48 (10th Cir. 1976).
When the tribe appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court, the federal government and
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the American Civil Liberties Union filed amicus briefs with the Court on behalf
of Mrs. Martinez. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, Santa Clara
Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978) (No. 76-682), 1977 WL 189113; Brief
for Amicus Curiae American Civil Liberties Union, Martinez, 436 U.S. 49
(1978) (No. 76-682), 1977 WL 189112.
In its amicus brief, the United States argued that federal courts have
jurisdiction over tribal officials under the ICRA, and this jurisdiction extends to
controversies over tribal membership, because without this remedy few rights
could be protected, leaving plaintiffs to seek relief from the same officials
against whom they filed a complaint. Brief for the United States as Amicus
Curiae, supra, at 24–25, 14–16. The government cited other instances where the
Court implied a private right of action even though federal statutes did not
expressly authorize their protected classes to sue, arguing Martinez included
many of the factors required in order to imply a private right of action. Id. at 16–
19. The government also argued that the tribe‘s membership ordinance violated
ICRA‘s equal protection clause. Id. at 25. The government, distinguishing
private civil rights actions from criminal trials, asserted that the tribe‘s
discriminatory membership ordinance was not justified by the tribe‘s interest in
preserving tribal culture and tradition. Id. at 20, 28. This was in agreement with
the appellate court, which had concluded that it had jurisdiction to hear the
claim because ―[o]therwise, [the ICRA] would constitute a mere unenforceable
declaration of principles.‖ Martinez, 540 F.2d at 1042.
The ACLU brief argued that the ordinance should be invalidated on
grounds of gender discrimination. ―[M]ost obviously, the ordinance is sexually
discriminatory and applies only to female Santa Clara members; male Santa
Clara members may marry anyone they choose, and their children will be tribal
members.‖ Brief for the American Civil Liberties Union, supra, at 23.
Several tribes and Indian organizations filed amicus briefs on behalf of the
Santa Clara Pueblo. See, e.g., Briefs of Amicus Curiae Confederated Tribes of
the Colville Indian Reservation in Support of Petitioners, Martinez, 436 U.S. 49
(1978) (No. 76-682), 1977 WL 204929; Motion to File Brief Amici Curiae and
Brief of Amici Curiae of the Pueblo de Cochiti, the Pueblo of Isleta, the Pueblo
of Jemez, the Pueblo of Laguna, the Pueblo of Sandia, the Pueblo of San Felipe,
the Pueblo of San Ildefonso, the Pueblo of Taos, the Hualapai Tribe, the Salt
River Pima-Maricopa Indian Community, the Confederated Tribes of the
Umatilla Indian Reservation and the All-Indian Pueblo Council, Inc., Martinez,
436 U.S. 49 (1978) (No. 76-682), 1976 WL 181159; Briefs of the Shoshone and
Arapahoe Tribes of the Wind River Indian Reservation, and the National
Congress of American Indians as Amici Curiae, Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978)
(No. 76-682), 1977 WL 189109; Briefs of the National Tribal Chairmen‘s Ass‘n
as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners, Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978) (No.
76-682), 1977 WL 189110; Motion for Leave to File Brief as Amici Curiae and
Brief Amici Curiae of the Seneca Nation of Indians of New York and the Ass‘n
on American Indian Affairs, Inc. in Support of the Petition for Writ of
Certiorari, Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978) (No. 76-682), 1976 WL 181158.
76
A handful of Justices had some reservations about the need to address the
question of tribal immunity in section III of Marshall‘s draft opinion, since in
section IV of Marshall‘s opinion squarely addresses the question of whether the
Indian Civil Rights Act authorizes suits in federal court. Martinez, 436 U.S. at
59. Justices Rehnquist, Powell, and Stevens stated their preference for omitting
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In ruling against Mrs. Martinez, the Court fully understood the
ramifications of its decision. Marshall wrote:
Although the children were raised on the reservation
and continue to reside there now that they are adults, as
a result of their exclusion from membership they may
not vote in tribal elections or hold secular office in the
tribe; moreover, they have no right to remain on the
reservation in the event of their mother‘s death, or to
inherit their mother‘s home or her possessory interests in
the communal lands.78
Part III, to which Marshall responded that he was ―moderately inclined‖ to leave
in Part III, but he was willing to remove it. Letter from Justice Thurgood
Marshall to Justices Lewis Powell and John Paul Stevens (Mar. 31, 1978) (on
file with the Library of Congress, Washington D.C., Harry A. Blackmun Papers,
Manuscript Division, Box 259, 76-682). Another letter from Justice Stewart to
Marshall referred to a conference in which Stewart advanced a different reason
for reversing the lower court‘s decision, but does not explain this theory in more
detail. Letter from Justice Potter Stewart to Justice Thurgood Marshall (Apr. 10,
1978) (on file with the Library of Congress, Washington D.C., Thurgood
Marshall Papers, Manuscript Division, Box 202, 76-682). But Marshall did not
remove Part III from the Court‘s final opinion, and Rehnquist refused to join
that part of the opinion. Martinez, 436 U.S. at 51. Justices Powell, Stevens,
Stewart, and Chief Justice Burger did join Marshall‘s opinion (Justice Blackmun
did not participate in the decision). Id.
77
Marshall justifies the Court‘s ruling, saying that Title I of the ICRA does not
waive Indian tribes‘ absolute immunity from suit in federal court. He writes:
Nothing on the face of Title I of the ICRA purports to subject
tribes to the jurisdiction of the federal courts in civil actions
for injunctive or declaratory relief. . . . In the absence here of
any unequivocal expression of contrary legislative intent, we
conclude that suits against the tribe under the ICRA are barred
by its sovereign immunity from suit.
Martinez, 436 U.S. at 59.
78
Id. at 52–53. Martinez‘s brief spelled out in even more detail some
ramifications of denying tribal rights to Julia Martinez:
Denial of membership has caused hardship to the Martinez
family, especially in obtaining federal medical care available
to Indians. In 1968 Julia Martinez‘s now-deceased daughter
Natalie, suffering from strokes associated with her terminal
illness, was refused emergency medical treatment by the
Indian Health Service. This was solely because her mother
had previously been unable to obtain tribal recognition for her.
Only after meeting with Interior Department solicitors did
Mrs. Martinez obtain Bureau of Indian Affairs census numbers
for her children. At the time of trial the Martinez children
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Nevertheless, he concluded that protection and respect for tribal
sovereignty is so important that it justifies ―occasionally . . . denying an
Indian plaintiff a forum to which a non-Indian has access, . . . because it
is intended to benefit the class of which he is a member by furthering the
congressional policy of Indian self-government.‖79 Reasoning that Mrs.
Martinez could pursue her claim in tribal courts, Marshall seemingly
ignored her prior unsuccessful efforts for relief within the Pueblo.80
Marshall‘s position in Martinez was consistent with his general
stance on Indian Law. A memorandum found in Marshall‘s papers
written around the same time in another case, United States v. Wheeler,81
contains his evolving views on tribal sovereignty.82 This memorandum
states that tribes possess the power of self-government as a result of
―residual sovereignty‖; tribes exercise some powers, such as criminal

were encountering no difficulties in receiving medical care, . .
. [but s]ince then . . . Martinez grandchildren have had
problems in obtaining medical care from the Indian Health
Service. Those of the Martinez children who are grown are
unable to obtain Pueblo land assignments upon which to make
homes of their own. To stay on the Pueblo, they must reside
with their mother or other member relatives.
Brief of Respondent at 3, Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978) (No. 76-682),
1977 WL 189106.
79
Martinez, 436 U.S. at 59–60 n.9 (1978) (quoting Fisher v. District Court, 424
U.S. 382, 390–91 (1976)).
80
Martinez attempted to resolve the matter internally, but the Pueblo
government refused to change its ordinance. Id. at 53. Marshall argues more
persuasively, however, that ―the structure of the statutory scheme and the
legislative history of Title I suggest that Congress‘ failure to provide remedies
other than habeas corpus was a deliberate one.‖ Id. at 61. He also notes that
Congress rejected proposals to provide for federal review in civil cases for
violations of the ICRA. According to Marshall the ICRA had the twin objectives
of ―strengthening the position of individual tribal members vis-à-vis the tribe, . .
. [and] ‗furthering Indian self-government.‘‖ Id. at 62.
81
435 U.S. 313 (1978).
82
Duthu, supra note 68, at 95–96. Duthu also describes a bench memorandum
written by Marshall‘s law clerk, Vicki Jackson, in which she discussed the need
to defer to tribal tradition. Id. at 100–02. Jackson, now a professor at
Georgetown University Law Center, has written several articles on Federal
Indian Law. See, e.g., Vicki C. Jackson, Coeur D‟Alene, Federal Courts and the
Supremacy of Federal Law: The Competing Paradigms of Chief Justices
Marshall and Rehnquist, 15 CONST. COMMENT. 301 (1998) (discussing a few
Indian law cases in the context of the Eleventh Amendment); Vicki C. Jackson,
Seminole Tribe, the Eleventh Amendment, and the Potential Evisceration of Ex
Parte Young, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 495, 500 (1997) (arguing that the Court‘s
holding regarding state sovereign immunity in Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517
U.S. 44 (1996), should be abandoned).
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jurisdiction, solely at the ―sufferance of the federal government.‖83
According to the Court‘s Indian law jurisprudence, the relationship of
the tribes to the federal government is that of dependent sovereign to
sovereign,84 and the legal relationship of the tribes to the states is that of
―quasi co-sovereigns.‖85 Marshall‘s opinions reflect this approach to
Indian Law.
A cursory review of these cases indicates that Marshall strongly
endorsed tribal sovereignty as against state encroachment.86 Because of
83

Duthu, supra note 68, at 95–96.
United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 203 (2004) (describing tribal sovereignty
as ―the degree of autonomy enjoyed by a dependent sovereign that is not a
State‖).
85
Washington v. Confederated Tribes of Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S.
134, 186 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., concurring and dissenting in part) (―If Indians
are to function as quasi co-sovereigns with the States, they like the States, must
adjust to the economic realities of that status . . . .‖); see, e.g., Nevada v. Hicks,
533 U.S. 353, 362 (2001). But see Plains Commerce Bank v. Long Family Land
& Cattle Co., 128 S. Ct. 2709, 2726 (2008) (―The sovereign authority of Indian
tribes is limited in ways state and federal authority is not.‖). Thus Congress can
exercise its plenary power over Indian affairs to give some of that power to the
states. Unless Congress empowers the states, they have no independent power
over the tribes. Duthu, supra note 68, at 95–96. For a discussion of Indian
sovereignty, see the three Supreme Court cases known as the (John) Marshall
Trilogy: Johnson v. M‘Intosh, 21 U.S. 543 (1823) (holding that European
conquest and the establishment of the United States diminished the complete
sovereignty of Indian tribes, leaving them legally incapable of conveying land to
private parties without the consent of the federal government); Cherokee Nation
v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1 (1831) (Indian tribes are ―domestic dependent nations‖
existing ―in a state of pupilage. Their relation to the United States resembles that
of a ward to his guardian.‖); and Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515 (1832)
(Indian tribes are ―distinct nations‖ over which states have no authority). In
1953 Congress terminated hundreds of tribes and gave extensive jurisdiction
over tribal affairs to several western states. Pub. L. No. 83-280, 67 Stat. 588.
This was the largest extension of federal powers to the states. See Kevin K.
Washburn, Federal Criminal Law and Tribal Self-Determination, 84 N.C. L.
REV. 779, 811–15 (2006) (describing the 1940s and 1950s as the ―Era of
Termination,‖ with the 1953 Act as its ―hallmark‖).
86
Marshall generally favored tribal ownership and regulation of land claims.
See, e.g., Choctaw Nation v. Oklahoma, 397 U.S. 620 (1970) (upholding tribal
ownership claims to a portion of the Arkansas River as against the state and
corporations to which the state had leased the riverbed‘s oil, gas, and mineral
rights); Cent. Mach. Co. v. Ariz. State Tax Comm‘n, 448 U.S. 160 (1980)
(upholding federal regulations regarding trading with Native Americans that
preempted the state taxation); Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130
(1982) (upholding the right of tribes to impose a severance tax on all oil and gas
taking from the tribal land); New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S.
324 (1983) (holding that the state‘s hunting and fishing regulations are not
applicable to non-tribal members licensed to hunt and fish on an Indian
reservation); United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206 (1983) (clearly establishing
84
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Marshall‘s strong views, a few commentators claim that he was too
―Indian-oriented.‖87 But in Martinez, Marshall‘s protection of tribal
sovereignty impinged on the rights of some women tribal members.
Jurist and legal scholar John T. Noonan Jr. argues that in law
individual claimants often get lost because of legal masks imposed by
courts.88 He writes about two types of masks: those imposed on
individuals and those imposed on the Court, both with societal
approval.89 Building on Noonan‘s analysis, David Wilkins argues that
most Indian Law cases involve situations where the Supreme Court ―has
manufactured or refined other ‗masks‘ to justify intrusions on tribal
sovereignty at the federal, state, and . . . county level . . . .‖90 Included in
the legal masks Wilkins lists is ―the theory of congressional and even
federal plenary power over tribes.‖91 Arguably, Marshall in Martinez
that the federal government has a fiduciary relationship with Native Americans
when statutes give the federal government a pervasive role in managing their
properties). Marshall also joined the majority in United States v. Wheeler, 435
U.S. 313 (1978), the first decision since 1896 explicitly based on inherent tribal
sovereignty and which clarified the principle that tribal powers trace back to
inherent sovereignty and not any grant of power from the federal government.
CHARLES F. WILKINSON, AMERICAN INDIANS, TIME, AND THE LAW 61–62
(1987). Marshall also supported tribal taxing power as against state
encroachment. See McClanahan v. State Tax Comm‘n of Ariz., 411 U.S. 164
(1973) (holding that Indians and Indian property on reservations are not subject
to state taxation unless authorized by Congress); White Mountain Apache Tribe
v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136 (1980) (holding that the state cannot tax a logging
business owned by non–Native Americans operated only on a reservation).
Marshall joined Blackmun‘s dissent in Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico,
490 U.S. 163, 193 (1989), where the Court held that federal law did not prevent
New Mexico from imposing severance taxes on non-Indian lessees‘ oil and gas
production from tribal reservation. He also opposed state regulations that
infringed on Native Americans‘ spiritual practices. Marshall joined in dissenting
opinions by Justices Brennan and Blackmun in two key Native American
religion cases, Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass‟n, 485 U.S.
439, 458 (1988) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (upholding the right of the U.S. Forest
Service to build a road on land considered sacred by the tribe as not violating
the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment) and Employment Division v.
Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 907 (1990) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (upholding a state‘s
right to refuse unemployment benefits to Native Americans who used peyote as
part of their spiritual practices as not violating the Free Exercise Clause of the
First Amendment).
87
See, e.g., Daniel L. Rotenberg, American States and Indian Tribes: Power
Conflicts in the Supreme Court, 92 DICK. L. REV. 81, 96 (1987).
88
JOHN T. NOONAN, JR., PERSONS AND MASKS OF THE LAW: CARDOZO,
HOLMES, JEFFERSON, AND WYTHE AS MAKERS OF THE MASKS 19–20 (1976).
89
Id. at 22–23.
90
DAVID E. WILKINS, AMERICAN INDIAN SOVEREIGNTY AND THE U.S. SUPREME
COURT: THE MASKING OF JUSTICE 9 (1997).
91
Id.
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unconsciously engages in a kind of simultaneous subordination,
endorsing Congress‘s power over Indian tribes while simultaneously
using this mask to, in Noonan‘s words, ―reduce the ‗person‘ [in this case
Mrs. Martinez] to a congerie of ‗rights.‘‖92 The tribe succeeds in
subordinating the autonomy of its female members while losing the
battle for its own greater autonomy.
From another perspective one might argue that Martinez was a race
case, an instance when Marshall preferred race over gender.93 But,
arguably, Marshall did not see himself as choosing between race and
gender; rather, he voted to preserve tribal autonomy. In his mind,
preservation of the tribal community might have seemed analogous to
preserving the Union; and Mrs. Martinez‘s challenge might have seemed
similar to black Americans‘ challenges to unequal treatment at the hands
of their government. Perhaps Marshall honestly believed that Mrs.
Martinez had to resort to her community‘s legal system for relief, just as
black Americans had to resort to American courts (and the public) for
relief from racial discrimination, even when those arenas initially might
have been hostile.
Without understanding the context, Marshall‘s position in Martinez
is troubling. Given his consistent voting record in other gender
discrimination cases, though, Marshall probably would have supported
Mrs. Martinez‘s claim had it not involved tribal self-governance.
Arguably, the issue in Martinez was unique, different from conventional
race or gender discrimination claims. For Marshall, Martinez was not a
race case but rather a case involving conflicting sovereigns. His
seemingly anti-woman position in the next case, however, cannot be as
easily reconciled.
C. FLORIDA STAR V. B.J.F.: WOMEN‟S PRIVACY VS. THE FIRST
AMENDMENT
Marshall also wrote the majority opinion in the last troubling case,
Florida Star v. B.J.F., which pitted freedom of the press against a

92

NOONAN, supra note 84, at xi–xii.
Sometimes discussions about American Indians are framed in race terms. See,
e.g., Carla D. Pratt, Contemporary Racial Realities: Tribal Kulturkampf: The
Role of Race Ideology in Constructing Native American Identity, 35 SETON
HALL L. REV. 1241 (2005); Bethany R. Berger, “Power over this Unfortunate
Race”: Race, Politics and Indian Law in United States v. Rogers, 45 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 1957 (2004); Luis Angel Toro, A People Distinct from Others:
Race and Identity in Federal Indian Law and the Hispanic Classification in
OMB Directive No. 15, 26 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1219 (1995); Carol GoldbergAmbrose, Not „Strictly‟ Racial: A Response to “Indians as Peoples,” 39 UCLA
L. REV. 169 (1991).
93
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woman‘s privacy interest.94 The Florida Star, a weekly newspaper,
reported that B.J.F. was robbed and raped by ―an unknown black man‖
while walking to a bus stop.95 The victim sued the newspaper because it
published her full name in its ―Police Reports‖ section in violation of
both the newspaper‘s internal policy and a state law prohibiting
publishing the name of sexual offense victims.96
According to the trial record, although B.J.F.‘s name was
―inadvertently included‖ in the crime report posted in the Sheriff‘s
pressroom, the pressroom ―contained signs making it clear that the
names of rape victims were not matters of public record, and were not to
be published.‖97 Further, the ―Star‘s reporter . . . understood that she
‗[was not] allowed to take down that information‘ . . . and that she ‗[was]
not supposed to take the information from the police department.‘‖98
B.J.F. prevailed at trial and was awarded compensatory and punitive
damages, and the paper appealed on First Amendment grounds.99
A majority of the Supreme Court sided with the newspaper.100
Marshall, writing for the majority, conceded that the State had a
substantial interest in protecting the privacy of a sexual assault victim.
Nevertheless, he continued, imposing civil liability on a newspaper for
publishing truthful information obtained lawfully from a public source
was not sufficiently narrowly tailored to accomplish the state‘s
interest.101 He downplayed the paper‘s actions, characterizing the Florida
Star reporter who drafted the newspaper‘s police report as a ―reportertrainee.‖102 The dissenters (Justice White, joined by Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justice O‘Connor) accused Marshall of ignoring the
record.103
Marshall‘s opinion focused on the fact that information about the
crime was ―publicly available.‖104 Once the information was publicly
94

Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524 (1989).
Id. at 526–27. The article stated that the man approached B.J.F. from behind,
placed a knife to her neck, undressed her, and sexually assaulted her ―before
fleeing the scene with her 60 cents, Timex watch and gold necklace.‖ Id. at 527.
96
Id. at 528. B.J.F. also sued the Duval County, Florida, Sheriff‘s Department,
which settled the claim before trial. Id.
97
Id. at 546 (White, J., dissenting).
98
Id. (alterations in original) (citation omitted).
99
Id. at 529. The Florida Supreme Court refused to review the Florida appellate
court decision. Florida Star v. B.J.F., 509 So. 2d 1117 (Fla. 1987); Florida Star,
491 U.S. at 529.
100
491 U.S. at 526.
101
Id. at 537, 541. Marshall notes that access to the pressroom of the Duval
County, Florida, Sheriff‘s Department was unrestricted. Id. at 527.
102
Id. at 527.
103
Id. at 546 (White, J., dissenting).
104
Id. at 535.
95

40

Virginia Journal of Social Policy & the Law

[Vol. 18:1

available, he reasoned, the state‘s interest in protecting the rape victim
was likely not served by prohibiting publication of her name.105 What
Marshall does not mention, but surely knew from the record, was that the
victim suffered additional injury as a result of the publication. The
victim, a nurse‘s assistant, learned that her name had been published in
the newspaper from her fellow employees as she lay in the hospital
recovering from the assault.106 Further, the day after the story appeared
in the Florida Star, the victim‘s home received a telephone call ―from a
man threatening to rape [her] again.‖107 The calls and publicity
ultimately caused her to change her telephone number and residence and
seek mental health counseling.108 These are the very consequences that
Florida law sought to prevent by barring publication of victims‘
names.109
Marshall‘s chief concern, however, seems to be that imposing
liability on the press for disclosures of truthful information might foster
press ―timidity and self-censorship.‖110 Once more, Marshall‘s position
seems consistent with his general philosophy about freedom of the press.
In First Amendment press cases, Marshall wanted newspapers to be able
to determine, with some degree of reliability, their potential liability
when publishing materials.111
Marshall emphasized general public access to information as a First
Amendment interest in other opinions, notably in his dissent in San
Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez.112 One legal scholar
theorizes that in freedom of the press cases Marshall believed that the
importance of this interest required clear line-drawing: ―[t]he specter of
self-censorship [by the press] posed a threat to realization of . . . [an
informed citizenry], and therefore required sacrifice of the flexibility
afforded in balancing.‖113 Thus, as in Martinez, Marshall was willing in
Florida Star to ―sacrifice‖ the individual interests of a woman for what
105

Id.
Brief for the Appellee at 10–11, Florida Star, 491 U.S. 524 (1989) (No. 87329).
107
491 U.S. at 547 n.2 (White, J. dissenting). According to the appellee‘s brief,
after the victim‘s name was published in the Florida Star her home received
several threatening telephone calls. Brief for the Appellee, supra note 106, at 11.
108
Brief for the Appellee, supra note 106, at 11.
109
491 U.S. at 457–58.
110
491 U.S. at 535.
111
Peter Krug, Justice Thurgood Marshall and News Media Law: Rules Over
Standards?, 47 OKLA. L. REV. 13, 17–18 (1994).
112
Marshall wrote, ―Education directly affects the ability of a child to exercise
his First Amendment rights, both as a source and as a receiver of information
and ideas . . . .‖ San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 112
(1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting). Peter Krug cites other examples of Marshall‘s
concern about ensuring an informed public. Krug, supra note 111, at 32–34.
113
Id. at 33.
106
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he saw as the greater societal good, an informed citizenry that would, if
truly representative, make the right decisions.114
A more cynical view is that Marshall surely knew that the Florida
Star, founded in 1951, claims to be the oldest black-owned newspaper in
Northeast Florida.115 Marshall was born and raised in Baltimore where
the Afro-American, an established black weekly, was an important
vehicle by which that community pressed for racial equality.116 Thus, he
would have understood that a substantial judgment against the paper
might end its existence and leave black residents of that Northeast
Florida community without a public voice. Arguably, then, race was
tangentially involved and may have further influenced his thinking in the
case.
Finally, Marshall‘s respect for precedent also may explain his vote
and opinion in Florida Star. (The dissenters in Florida Star, however,
argue that Marshall misuses the precedents he cites.)117 On the other
hand, Marshall‘s position in Florida Star may be more analogous to his
position in Martinez, which privileged concerns for the larger
community over those of an individual community member.
Unfortunately, Marshall‘s files in Martinez and Florida Star do not
provide any clues about whether pragmatism, stare decisis, or race
loyalty, consciously or unconsciously, influenced his vote.
IV. CONCLUSION
Around the time Marshall stepped down from the bench, Constance
Baker Motley publicly acknowledged his ―unique contributions to the
advancement of women in the law,‖ noting that he ―had no qualms about
women being given equal employment opportunities. . . . If it had not
been for Thurgood Marshall, no one would ever have heard of Constance
Baker Motley.‖118 In her tribute to Marshall, Motley writes, ―[N]obody
had to tell him that African-American males were on the bottom rung of
114

Cf. NOONAN, supra note 84, at xi–xii (discussing the scholarly and judicial
masking of individuals in order to accomplish ―the highest ideal . . . to do
‗justice‘ by enforcing . . . rights‖).
115
The Florida Star, About, http://www.thefloridastar.com/?page_id=444 (last
visited June 30, 2010).
116
Hayward Farrar, in chronicling the Baltimore Afro-American during the first
half of the twentieth century, ―recounts the newspaper‘s coverage of struggles
for political power, opposition to lynching, many fights against legal
segregation, continuing attempts to improve education for the black community,
African American participation in World Wars I and II, and the efforts of both
local and national leaders.‖ Suzanne Ellery Chapelle, 66 J. S. HIST. 148 (2000)
(reviewing HAYWARD FARRAR, THE BALTIMORE AFRO-AMERICAN, 1892–1950
(1998)).
117
See 491 U.S. at 543–46 (White, J., dissenting).
118
Motley, My Personal Debt, supra note 47, at 19, 20, 24.

42

Virginia Journal of Social Policy & the Law

[Vol. 18:1

the ladder in every conceivable professional endeavor and that AfricanAmerican women were not even on the ladder.‖119 Her comments suggest
that Marshall, perhaps intuitively, recognized the intersection of race and
gender, especially in the workplace. Nevertheless, during the years that
Marshall and Motley overlapped at LDF, it was, like most legal
organizations of the time, a ―boys‘ club.‖ Robert Carter, reflecting on
those early years, writes, ―[T]he absence of women from that inner circle
of cooperating lawyers and law professors is evident to me, but it never
crossed my mind then.‖120
When Marshall left LDF he selected Jack Greenberg, a white male,
rather than Constance Baker Motley, a black woman, as his successor.121
One can only speculate as to his reasons for preferring a white man over
a black woman to lead a civil rights organization primarily devoted to
black civil rights.122 Motley once described Marshall as a ―complex
person‖ who did not think it strange that a woman was a lawyer.123 But
he might have thought it strange to have a woman lawyer lead the
premier civil rights legal arm in the years immediately following Brown
v. Board of Education.
Marshall‘s record on gender equality while on the Court is stronger
than the record of its then sole female member, Sandra Day O‘Connor.124
He consistently supported women‘s employment and reproductive rights,
but he also seemed willing in cases like Martinez and Florida Star to
sacrifice individual rights for larger community goals. Arguably, his
failure to join Justice Douglas‘s concurrence in Alexander can also be
explained this way: Marshall sacrificed the rights of black and white
women to serve on juries to protect black defendants from racially biased
jury pools.
If there were any inconsistencies in his approach to gender
discrimination claims, they probably never crossed his mind. He was,
119

Id. at 20 (emphasis added).
CARTER, supra note 35, at 99. Carter continues, ―[O]f the staff [which
included Marian Perry and Motley] only Thurgood and I actively engaged in the
conceptual analysis with the committee members in deciding on a proposal.‖ Id.
121
See CONSTANCE BAKER MOTLEY, EQUAL JUSTICE UNDER LAW 150–51
(1998).
122
Cf. id. at 151 (―Not only would it have been difficult to place a woman in his
position, . . . [but] Thurgood also had difficulty with the idea of a woman in a
leadership role in a male world.‖).
123
Video: Constance Baker Motley: Working for Thurgood Marshall
(National Visionary Leadership Project), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Prn
nT_iuuEQ&feature=player_embedded (last visited Apr. 5, 2009).
124
See Lens, supra note 21, at 523–25 (noting that in a study of the Justices‘
votes in gender discrimination in employment cases from 1971 to 2002,
Marshall ―cast pro-feminist votes 92% . . . of the time . . . and Sandra Day
O‘Connor . . . voted the pro-feminist position 71% . . . of the time.‖).
120
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after all, a man who had grown up in a time when women were generally
absent from the public sphere. While not antagonistic to the idea of
gender equality, Marshall seemed most concerned about racial equality,
perhaps because it encompasses both women and men, during an era
when an ideology of white male supremacy reigned in the country.
Without question, Thurgood Marshall was a race man, but he was
also a friend to women, even though many might not classify him as a
feminist. Perhaps he is better described as a ―pragmatic feminist,‖
informed by his experience in the South and cognizant that meaningful
equality for black Americans required equality for black men and black
women. Thurgood Marshall, although a progressive man for his times on
gender issues, was still a product of those times. Nevertheless, women in
the United States are better off today because he sat on the Supreme
Court at a crucial time in women‘s twentieth century social and legal
history.

